

Patryk Babiracki • Austin Jersild  
Editors

# Socialist Internationalism in the Cold War

Exploring the Second World

palgrave  
macmillan

## Editors' Introduction

*Patryk Babiracki and Austin Jersild*

There was “no single practice of communism,” emphasizes Maria Todorova in a discussion of memory and the socialist world, but there were “similar trajectories” and similar blueprints, institutions, and experiences that made what we are calling in this volume the “Second World,” something distinctly different from either the “First” or “Third.”<sup>1</sup> The growth in the study of memory, “socialist consumerism,” and difficult post-socialist “transitions,” as well as the more popular forms of *Ostalgie* in film, exhibits, and literature, all attest to the existence of the distinct and shared experience of socialism.<sup>2</sup> Even Berlin, famously remaking itself today as the new capital of the new Germany, routinely offers glimpses of historical and social experience more familiar to residents of Warsaw, Budapest, and Moscow than to its many tourists and recently arrived former West Germans. “From here [Berlin] to Vladivostok,” recounted journalist and writer Anna Funder, more than a decade ago, there was “inoleum and grey cement, asbestos and prefabricated concrete,” in her disillusioned view, all part of “Communism’s gift to the built environment.”<sup>3</sup>

---

P. Babiracki (✉)

University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX, USA

A. Jersild

Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA

© The Author(s) 2016

P. Babiracki, A. Jersild (eds.), *Socialist Internationalism in the Cold War*,  
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32570-5\_1

The "Second World" had distinctive characteristics, evolved over time, featured transnational exchange and was itself a product of transnational exchange, was highly significant to the evolution of the Cold War, and continues to shape this vast "Eurasian" space today.<sup>4</sup> Topics of study are routinely difficult to confine within the boundaries of a particular nation-state.<sup>5</sup> We refer to this world as "the Second World," both in order to convey its distinctness and interconnectedness and to mark the historiographic shift of which this volume is part. Multiple forms of exchange, shared experiences, perceptions, and dilemmas that crossed boundaries and borders, both transnational or within the socialist world and transsystemic or across the "Iron Curtain," shaped the history and evolution of the Second World.<sup>6</sup> Travel and exchange and its significance repeatedly emerge as topics for exploration in this volume, including attention to important foreign visitors and foreign influences, and the circulation within the Second World of ideas, practices, and norms. As Wendy Bracewell pointed out, "travels within the fraternal countries of the Socialist bloc were simultaneously travels abroad (new sights and sounds, different ways of doing things, perhaps even a different range of goods on sale) and travels at home (a shared socialist and internationalist ideology)."<sup>7</sup> Travel and transnational influences both affirmed the shared identity of the Second World and led to its fragmentation.

Few observers referred to the Second World during the Cold War; when they did, it was to use it as shorthand for the Soviet-type planned economies.<sup>8</sup> Early works tended to focus on those transnational institutions and practices that were central to policing, stability, and order.<sup>9</sup> The policies of the Soviet Union, at least initially, seemed designed to curtail rather than facilitate exchange and communication, as mystified East Europeans sometimes complained.<sup>10</sup> The primary Soviet interest was initially focused on the creation of a secure buffer zone against a future attack from the West. Over time, however, the Soviet and East European communists also thoroughly transformed their countries' landscapes, languages, fashions, rhythms of industrial production, identities, and values. By the 1970s, the inhabitants of the Second World came to share a distinct culture, which eventually outlived socialist political systems; it is also a culture that has been rarely acknowledged, much less "theorized."<sup>11</sup> These social and cultural aspects of the Second World lie at the center of our volume.

The Second World was both a promise and a problem to Moscow, especially in the era of reform and "peaceful coexistence" that emerged after the death of Stalin in 1953. "Let us verify in practice whose system is

better," Nikita Khrushchev proclaimed in India. "We say to the leaders of the capitalist states: Let us compete without war."<sup>12</sup> The improved functioning and health of the Bloc was a crucial part of the official Soviet effort to "catch up with and surpass" the United States. Khrushchev and numerous reformers highly valued the skills and experiences of especially countries such as East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and many East Europeans were pleased that their advanced standing within the Second World was finally recognized.<sup>13</sup> Polish sociologists, for example, were proud that they were in a position to offer their Soviet counterparts exposure to the "sociologists of the West."<sup>14</sup> The virtues of Eastern Europe were on display at the Czechoslovak pavilion at the World's Fair in Brussels in 1958.<sup>15</sup> The presentation of consumer culture (restaurants, tourist trips, fashion, hot springs in Karlovy Vary, restored churches in Prague), industrial productivity (Kaplan turbines), and high culture (the Czech Philharmonic) displayed by the Czechoslovaks was much approved by the Soviets.<sup>16</sup> When Czechoslovak Party First Secretary, Antonín Novotný, was in Moscow July 2-4, 1958, he listened to Khrushchev praise the "contribution of Czechoslovakia to the development of commerce between the east and the West." Soviet Minister of Defense, Kliment Voroshilov, visited the Czechoslovak pavilion, and pronounced it "splendid, superb, simply magnificent."<sup>17</sup>

The problem was that the region was also now a source of instability for the Soviet Union itself.<sup>18</sup> Czechoslovakia was quiet in 1956, but the "events" in Poland and Hungary that summer and fall alarmed communist party leaders and many others throughout the Bloc. In internal but frank debate, the distant Chinese, high officials, diplomats, advisers, and others worried about the weaknesses of the Soviet model, the advising program, Socialist Bloc exchange, the planning process, and even posed questions about the role of historic Russian imperialism (although now generally formulated as "great power chauvinism"). Khrushchev's optimism about the superiority of Soviet socialism seemed especially unconvincing in countries long exposed to alternatives. Exchange and travel also ironically meant greater East European exposure to the Soviet Union, confirming the assumptions of many in the region about traditional Russian backwardness in comparison to lands further West.

These developments even form the background to the Sino-Soviet split, so dramatically expressed in the sudden withdrawal of numerous Soviet advisers, teachers, and industrial specialists from China in the summer of 1960. "Socialist consumerism" and dissent were not what the Chinese

Communist Party had in mind when Chairman Mao opted to "lean to one side" and "learn from the Soviet Union."<sup>19</sup> From the perspective of the evolution of the Bloc, the frustration was mutual: the Chinese were frustrated by forms of economic, industrial, and cultural development that they felt did not address the needs of China's special "experience," and Soviet officials were concluding that the future of the Bloc belonged in further engagement with the more industrial and consumer societies of the West rather than the agrarian and undeveloped East.<sup>20</sup> Reform, peaceful coexistence, and further engagement with the West appeared to have dangerous consequences. The Chinese watched these matters closely throughout the 1950s, and along with the Albanians and North Koreans, eventually denounced both the Soviets and their fraternal allies for their "revisionist" betrayal of the October Revolution.<sup>21</sup> The Second World found itself in competition with both the West and the Chinese in the developing conflicts of the Third World, an important new arena of Cold War competition.<sup>22</sup>

In part, the Second World was held together by common claims about the virtues and special characteristics of "internationalism." As is well known, nineteenth century socialist theorists used the term as a call to arms; they wanted to mobilize the working classes across the world for cooperation in the struggle against capitalist exploitation. Ostensibly with the same intention, the twentieth century communist regimes intermittently deployed internationalist rhetoric in order to undermine the capitalist West, to consolidate the Second World, or to reach out to the Third.<sup>23</sup> From the beginning, however, the term "internationalism" was unstable and therefore amenable to transformations within the increasingly complex international workers' movement.<sup>24</sup> Publicly, Soviet officials, journalists, and authorities at first meant by "proletarian internationalism" egalitarian cooperation between working classes of various nations, but under Stalin, the term "internationalism" (increasingly qualified as "socialist" after World War II) came to connote Soviet dominance.<sup>25</sup> The Soviet relationship with foreign countries was fraught with contradictions. Peaceful outreach to governments abroad in the 1920s went hand-in-hand with the subversive activities of the Comintern, while the official anti-Westernism and isolation that characterized the 1930s was accompanied by both widespread industrial exchange and targeted cultural outreach meant to generate hard currency (used, in turn, to finance Soviet industrialization).<sup>26</sup> Perhaps the greatest irony was that despite all their lip service to internationalism, the communist regimes became notorious for their relentless attempts to control movements across borders.<sup>27</sup> Communist authorities

from East Germany to China and Cuba worked hard to obstruct any cross-border traffic that they deemed either unrelated or threatening to their own projects; it is perhaps another distinct feature of the Second World that the line between the two was often unclear.<sup>28</sup>

The relatively wide scale and scope of international interactions within the Second World is therefore striking. This was particularly true during and after the rule of Nikita Khrushchev, who opened up the USSR to the world between 1955 and 1957.<sup>29</sup> But even the Stalinists before him had struggled to reconcile those effects of international outreach that strengthened their power with those unintended consequences of transnational exchange that undermined it.<sup>30</sup> As a result, the international structures that the communists created in order to build up the Soviet empire or their own individual power bases sometimes served to undermine the imperial goals. As the rulers of the Second World inherited these Stalinist institutions and developed new organizations for international cooperation and exchange, opportunities to engage in what could be termed "informal internationalism" also grew. "At the beginning, there were three Europes," wrote Polish poet Agnieszka Osiecka on the eve of socialism's collapse. She described "the prescribed Europe," for instance "a Sport Tournament in one of the brotherly countries"; the "permitted Europe," which included Picasso; and "the forbidden Europe" of Franz Kafka. Osiecka admitted that in 1955 "Kafka was still far away"; however, "the permitted Europe was flooding in through a variety of gaps and holes."<sup>31</sup> By the time the Second World came into being, "internationalism" evolved from a revolutionary program into something of a condition, a state, and a situation, which included diverse forms of international entanglements. As a starting point for making sense of them, we take Akira Iriye's definition of internationalism as "an idea, a movement, or an institution that seeks to reformulate the nature of relations among nations through cross-national cooperation and interchange."<sup>32</sup> How did such various types of contacts shape or reveal the unique contours of Eurasian space in the second half of the twentieth century? Should we speak about the Second World in territorial or relational terms, or both? What do cross-border interactions reveal about the functioning of communist institutions, cultures, and societies together? What do they say about the persistent tension between homogeneity and diversity, which characterizes imperial systems and which the communists also tried to resolve? Do these interactions tell us something about the distinctness of the Second World with regards to the First and the Third? These questions are central to this volume.

The chapters in this volume are organized into five sections. The sections and the contributions follow a chronological-geographic order. Such organization, we thought, would both highlight the multiplying forms as well as shifting patterns of internationalism and put into relief the evolving, increasingly contested nature of the "Second World." Thus, Part I zooms in on the time of gestation of the Second World between the last months of World War II and the end of the Stalin era. The division of Europe that was a central feature of the Cold War was of course unimaginable without the catastrophic war. Coping with the consequences and aftermath of German expansion to the East and the Soviet-German struggle is at the center of the article by Lars Peder Haga, who reminds us of the importance of this issue for Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov and Czechoslovak writer Oles' Honchar. Central issues important to the early formation of the Second World, such as the anxiety surrounding *kul'turnost'*, ideas about backwardness in relation to "Europe," the depth of humanity supposedly found in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the leading role of the Soviet Union, and what Haga refers to as the "hierarchy of suffering" experienced in the war, endured throughout its entire history. In the next chapter, Balázs Apór describes the making and function of the Stalin cult in Hungary, a key part of the "system of myths and rituals that was deployed with the aim of constructing the Second World." As is clear in Balázs Apór's contribution, the Stalinists embarked on the creation of a socialist world; but, in reproducing models and copying ideas, they initially rarely relied on direct international human contacts. This section shows that the Second World under Stalin was, in a sense, a virtual world—a world of symbols and references that connected people who had otherwise little experience of one another.

Part II illustrates how the freedoms that so famously changed the lives of millions of people in Eastern Europe complicated the earlier forms of cohesion in the Second World. Rethinking the statues of Stalin was of course just one example of the remaking of public space in the socialist world. Patryk Babiracki's exploration of the reports of Soviet Komsomol delegates who travelled to Poland illustrates the markedly different concerns of Soviets and Poles as they related to the changes and new possibilities of Khrushchev-era reform, and to a potential Polish "path" to socialism. The Soviet heritage itself was diverse and potentially provocative, David Crowley reminds us in his article, which explores the surprising endurance of early Soviet architectural experimentation in Eastern Europe. The "afterimages" of the Soviet avant-garde "haunted" the Second World,

sometimes posing uncomfortable questions about revolution and culture during the familiar moments of political crisis, such as 1956, 1968, and 1989. Both youth activism and artistic cross-pollination had begun as official initiatives of the party-states. Both gave rise to lasting contacts beyond the sanctioned institutions, and often, directly or obliquely challenged the status quo. Attention to these forms of contact reminds us that internationalism had many faces; the disruptive dimension of internationalism helps to explain why, after a decade of coerced expansion, the Second World slowly began to implode.<sup>33</sup>

Part III examines the communist efforts to create a distinct international socialist culture. Kyrill Kunakhovich examines the twists and turns of Polish-East German cultural exchanges, where cultural experimentation from places like Poland was perceived as profoundly threatening for a communist elite anxious about its claims to represent German high culture and tradition. Marsha Siefert traces the little-known Soviet international outreach initiatives in the realm of cinema. Both authors raise important questions about the mixed effects of international socialist exchanges. They demonstrate that for all their ambiguous results, the idea that something akin to the crystallization of a Second World culture, with its internationalist institutions, canons, and elites, is difficult to dismiss.

Parts IV and V venture further afield and examine the Second World's linkages with the First and Third worlds. Despite the internal turmoil, the essays suggest that, within the Bloc in the wake of Stalin's death, the socialist world remained a distinct sphere circumscribed by its institutions, practices, and norms. The global context to these essays puts the Second World's relative cohesion into relief. Pia Koivunen shows that Westerners had to earn (and could easily lose) the label of a "friend," depending on their performance during the 1957 festival; a handful of Poles, on the other hand, much as they sowed foment during the event, could do so only thanks to the new policies and even distraction of the party-states. In Mark Keck-Szajbel's contribution, the cosmopolitan encounters during Czechoslovak motorcross competitions were accompanied by the intense Second-World culture of secrecy and surveillance.

The Third World was suspicious of the First World but also learning about the Second, whose outreach abroad was shaped by not just the momentous Sino-Soviet split but also by rivalry among the different alliance partners. Jeremiah Wisshon returns to the World Youth Festivals introduced by Pia Koivunen to explore Soviet efforts to foster connections between the socialist world and Indian public opinion. Nonaligned

states and "potential friends" such as India became increasingly important to the makers of Khrushchev-era foreign policy in an increasingly complicated Cold War. China figures prominently in the contributions from both David Tompkins and Austin Jersild. China's supposed discipline, effort, and communal labor could easily be romanticized in places like Poland and East Germany, as Tompkins describes, reminding us of the complexities the split posed for public culture and debate within the Bloc and also of the potential use to be made of the Chinese example by critics of Khrushchev's reformist agenda. Even in the 1950s, China claimed for itself a special connection to the developing societies of the Third World, yet another dilemma for the socialist world after 1960. Jersild describes the shared concerns of Guinea-Conakry and China about the limitations and weaknesses of the socialist world in the early 1960s. In the business of the promotion of internationalism, by the 1960s, the Second World had not only its own domestic skeptics but critics in China, Asia, and the very Third World it claimed to represent.

## NOTES

1. Todorova, "Introduction," 1–25.
2. Lindenberger, "Experts with a Cause," 29–42; Todorova and Gille, eds., *Post-Communist Nostalgia*; Hodgkin and Pearce, eds., *The GDR Remembers*; Giustino, Plum, and Vari, eds., *Socialist Escapes*; Bren and Neuberger, eds., *Communism Unwrapped*; Siegelbaum, ed., *The Socialist Car*; Crowley and Reid, eds., *Pleasures in Socialism*; Ghodsee, *The Red Riviera*.
3. Funder, *Svalbard*, 124. Or in the words of Ivan Volgyes: "The legacy of the system is visible and recognizable from Moscow to Prague, and from Warsaw to Sofia." Volgyes, "The Legacies of Communism," 2.
4. Some thinkers and politicians, especially in Russia, have used the term "Eurasia" since the nineteenth century to give meaning to the Russian-dominated parts of Europe and Asia. In Stephen Kotkin's terms, such Eurasia was "autarkic, messianic, apologetic (for empire) and demotic (illiberally 'democratic')." See Kotkin, "Mongol Commonwealth?" 495. In contrast, we mean by "Eurasia" the territories that largely (though not completely) overlapped with the socialist "Second World" in order to emphasize the international dimensions of socialist exchange.
5. For just a few examples, see Verdery, *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?*; Palmowski, *Inventing a Socialist Nation*; Meng, *Shattered Spaces*; Brenner and Humos, *Sozialgeschichtliche Kommunismusforschung*; Gatejel, "The Common Heritage of the Socialist Car Culture," 143–56.
6. See Kotkin, "Mongol Commonwealth?"; David-Fox, "The Iron Curtain as Semipermeable Membrane," 14–39; David-Fox, "The Implications of Transnationalism," 885–904; Méhilli, "The Socialist Design," 635–65; Méhilli, "Socialist Encounters," 107–133; Gorsuch and Koenker, eds., *Turisms*; Gorsuch and Koenker, *The Socialist Sixties*; Siegelbaum, ed., *The Socialist Car*; Borodziej, ed., *Schleichwege*; Logemann, *Das polnische Fenster*; Mikkonen and Koivunen, eds., *Beyond the Divide*.
7. Bracewell, ed., *East Looks West*, 299.
8. Giddens, *Sociology*. The reluctance to refer to the Second World may have had something to do with fear of offending; however, as Odd Arne Westad reminds us, the term "Third World," which also implied the "First" and "Second" Worlds, originally carried emancipatory connotations—see *Global Cold War*, 2.
9. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc*; Hacker, *Der Ostblock*. More recently, see Kramer, "Stalin, Soviet Policy, and the Establishment of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe, 1941–1949," in Kramer and Smerana, eds., *Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain*, 3–37; Kemp-Welch, "Eastern Europe," in Lefler and Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, 219–37; Applebaum, *Iron Curtain*; Voloktina, Murashko, Noskova, and Pokivaliova, *Moskva i postsovnaiia evropa*; Voloktina, Islamov, Murashko, Noskova, and Pogovaia, eds., *Vostochnaiia evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov*; Vykoukal, Litera, and Tejchman, *Vychod*.
10. 14 June 1945, "Uvolnenie spisového materiálu, 382/45, MZV TO—O 1945-59, SSSR, krabice 30, obal 26; Babiracki, *Soviet Soft Power in Poland*, 88.
11. Waldstein, "Theorizing the Second World," 98–117; Babiracki, "Interfacing the Soviet Bloc," 376–407.
12. Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, 57.
13. On matters ranging from consumer marketing to culture, foreign policy, and technical expertise, see Bren and Neuberger, eds.,

- Communism Unraveled*, Pernes, *Križe komunistického režimu v Československu*, 36–44; Békés, “Cold War, Détente, and the Soviet Bloc,” in Kramer and Smetana, eds., *Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain*, 247–276; Castillo, *Cold War on the Home Front*; Gilbert, “Picasso in Thaw Culture,” 65–108; Jersild, “The Soviet State as Imperial Scavenger,” 109–132. For an early work on the influence of Eastern Europe on the USSR, see Szporluk, ed., *The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR*.
14. 31 October 1961, “Zapis’ besedy,” F. I. Konstantinov and Adam Schaff, GARF f. 9518, op. 1, d. 133, l. 195–96.
  15. Giustino, “Industrial Design and the Czechoslovak Pavilion at EXPO ‘58,” 185–212.
  16. *Expo ‘58: Československá restaurace*, May 3, 1958, “Cestovní zpráva,” Jiří Čaforek, NA ČSOK, krabice 28, folder C; Official Programme 58 (May 15, 1958), 11, and Programme Officiel 58 (July 18, 1958), 5, NA ČSOK, krabice 15, folder Propagace ‘Official Programme.’
  17. *La Tchécoslovaquie a Bruxelles* 58, no. 5, NA ČSOK, folder La Tchécoslovaquie, 9, cover.
  18. Weiner, “The Empires Pay a Visit,” 333–76; Wojnowski, “De-Stalinization and Soviet Patriotism,” 799–829.
  19. Bernstein and Li, eds., *China Learns from the Soviet Union*.
  20. Jersild, *The Sino-Soviet Alliance*.
  21. 15 March 1958, “Zapis’ besedy,” P. Iudin and Mao Zedong, AVPRF f. 0100, op. 51, p. 432, d. 6, l. 93; 7 December 1956, “Li He tongzhi gei Deng Tuo tongzhi de dianbao,” WJBDAG 109-01617-08, 51; Méhilli, “Defying De-Stalinization,” 4–56.
  22. Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*.
  23. Engerman, “The Second World’s Third World,” 183–211; Hilger, ed., *Die Sowjetunion und die Dritte Welt*; Katsakioris, “L’Union soviétique et les intellectuels africains,” 15–32; idem., “The Soviet-South Encounter,” 134–165; Möller, *DDR und Dritte Welt*; Mark, Apor, Vučetić, and Oseká, “We Are with You, Vietnam,” 439–464.
  24. See “Internationalismus” in Labice and Bensusan, eds., *Kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus*; also “Internationalismus” in Stéphane Courtois, ed., *Das Handbuch des Kommunismus*.
  25. Albert, “From ‘World Soviet’ to ‘Fatherland of All Proletarians,’” 85–119, esp. 105; David-Fox, *Showcasing*, e.g. 28; Quimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy*.
  26. Ullam, *Expansion and Coexistence*; David-Fox, *Showcasing*, 175; Cohen, “Circularity Localities,” 11–45; on official anti-Western rhetoric, see Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism*; Brooks, *Thank You Comrade Stalin!*.
  27. Chandler, *Institutions of Isolation*; Stola, *Kraj bez vyjścia?*.
  28. Alfred Rieber’s term “blocking” playfully captured this double tendency of engaging in socialist integration while simultaneously obstructing movement across borders. “Blocking: Opportunities and Obstacles to Exchanges among Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe,” unpublished keynote address for the workshop “Exploring the Second World: Socialist Internationalism in the Cold War,” Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam, June 19, 2014.
  29. Gould-Davies, “The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy,” 193–214; Gilbert, “The Revival of Soviet Internationalism in the Mid to Late 1950s,” 362–401.
  30. On technical exchanges under Stalin, see Jersild, *Sino-Soviet Alliance*, Part I; on student exchanges see Babiracki, “Imperial Heresies,” 199–236; and Tromly, “Brother or Other?” 80–102; on peasant exchanges see Babiracki, “The Taste of Red Watermelon,” 40–77; see also Rutter, “The Western Wall,” 78–106.
  31. Agnieszka Osiecka, *Szeptni czerdzisztolejni* (1985), quoted in Murawska-Muthesius, “The Cold-War Traveller’s Gaze,” 325.
  32. Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, 3; for recent studies that use the term broadly with regards to socialism, see Kirschenbaum, *International Communism*, 2; Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism*, 1–10; and even Pons, *The Global Revolution*, xii; see also Eichenberg and Newman, eds., *The Great War and Veterans’ Internationalism*; and Werner and Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison,” 30–50.
  33. On the tension between the practices of “friendship” and “internationalism” that were promoted by regimes that simultaneously feared cross-border contact, see Applebaum, “The Friendship Project,” 484–507.

## Two Stairways to Socialism: Soviet Youth Activists in Polish Spaces, 1957–1964

*Patryk Babiracki*

“Some see it as a Russki fist, others are speechless with delight,” noted the Polish writer Leopold Tyrmand in his diary on February 14, 1954. He had just attended an exhibition of the development project for the Stalin Square, in the heart of Warsaw. In the center of the Square stood the controversial Palace of Culture and Science, a layer-cake skyscraper, which the USSR had offered to Poland as a gift.<sup>1</sup> Tyrmand was among those who “spat” on its “proportions, an un-Warsaw scale, the pompous style.”<sup>2</sup> The steel frame would have been acceptable, in the writer’s eyes; what made it intolerable was the architects’ choice to cover the building with pre-fabricated sand-colored facing, stick on it a pseudo-Renaissance tower-dome, layer-cake attics and finials, and other such elements. “The horror of socialist realism materialized in the very center of the city like a blooming growth on a drunkard’s nose,” Tyrmand wrote. Had the tall building been covered with glass instead, he would have rejoiced and even “forgave them” for the Russian General Suworov, who slaughtered the

---

I wish to thank Christopher Morris, Jens Gieseke, Austin Jersild and the participants of the workshop “Exploring the Second World” for their comments on earlier drafts.

P. Babiracki (✉)  
University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX, USA

© The Author(s) 2016

P. Babiracki, A. Jersild (eds.), *Socialist Internationalism in the Cold War*,  
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32570-5\_4



population of Warsaw as he quelled an anti-Russian rebellion at the end of the eighteenth century.<sup>3</sup>

Tyrmand's cocky criticisms surpassed aesthetic outrage and Russophobic rant. It also went beyond the critique of the Palace of Culture and Science. The writer attacked the idea that architects, like all artists under socialism, had to produce works that were "modern in function" and "traditional in form," a guiding principle of socialist realism. The "function of architecture has not changed since the dawn of human history on this earth," he argued, while the idea that today's architecture must, "for the good of man," resemble architectural forms from "yesterday, yesteryear, and four centuries before carries within itself an undisguised folly."<sup>4</sup> Like some of his French mentors—Tyrmand had studied architecture in Paris—the writer viewed a city as an "accumulation." Even ugly buildings become beautiful as they age—"something condenses around them, which can be called atmosphere, ambiance, or style. They collect events and experiences, individual and communal"; overtime, they "blend into the shape and detail of the facades, which become unique memorials and symbols."<sup>5</sup> Consistently with this view, the one thing one mustn't do is to build "in a past style," for the fruits of such efforts are doomed to become a parody and kitsch. And the Palace of Culture and Science constituted only a part of the problem; the nearby Warsaw Residential Quarter (MDM) for the new elites—Tyrmand mocked its "bedding hung out to air" amidst the "monumental column caps" and "the chickens slaughtered for Sunday supper"—was unlikely to acquire a pleasant patina as well.<sup>6</sup> The writer forecast that the rest of Poland's capital would become just like the MDM: "a rather nightmarish vision."<sup>7</sup>

But few known Soviet visitors to Poland shared Tyrmand's repulsion. The journalist Nikolai Bubnov, who walked past the Palace on his way to the Soviet Embassy in August 1954, clearly relished the view of its rising skeleton. He noted with a certain pride in his diary that when finished, the Palace would be more than 100 meters high.<sup>8</sup> Upon its completion on July 23, 1955, the building measured 237 meters, twice what the journalist had imagined it would be. Soviet tourists visited the Palace regularly on the ever more frequent tours of Eastern Europe. *Ogonek*, the Soviet illustrated weekly, described the Palace as "embody[ing] all the Soviet Union's many gifts to Poland, as well as its brotherly superiority."<sup>9</sup> Stalin's gift to the Polish people was to bear witness to the newfound friendship between Soviet and Polish peoples; instead, it became a source of new divisions.

The meaning of Poland's tallest building may have become the most obvious center of contestation, but differences of opinion about the place of space in the Soviet–East European relationship went much farther. In fact, the 35-year-old Tyrmand captured eloquently what could be called the official Stalinist "chronotope" of the Soviet empire and the expanding "Second World." The literary scholar Mikhail Bakhtin had coined the term to refer to an "intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships."<sup>10</sup> "In the literary artistic chronotope," Bakhtin wrote, "spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history." As the Soviets exported its architectural models and political culture abroad, the region borrowed the Stalinist spatial arrangements from the USSR. With their new broad arteries, expansive squares, and tall buildings, the East European capitals' new topographies turned into a form of totalitarian control, rendering the average human being smaller, more exposed, and more vulnerable. From Berlin and Budapest to Prague and Warsaw, the new organization of space reminded everyone about the ongoing revolution and about the heroes who made it possible.<sup>11</sup> The new spatial order also functioned as a souvenir of the glorious future that awaited the countries' inhabitants. Thus, the Stalinist authorities in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and beyond linked new spatial arrangements to a novel understanding of time.

Yet at the time when Tyrmand was jotting down his observations, he could not have known that over the next few decades, the unique Stalinist spatial-temporal order would gradually come undone both in Poland and in the USSR. The writer's entropic vision would never be realized, and Warsaw would not turn into a supersized MDM. The Sovietization of East European space was an important and by far the most dramatic stage in the development of the imperial chronotope. But what about its less spectacular, gradual withering away? How did people *experience* the evolving spatial-temporal order? How did those who "spat" on it like Tyrmand negotiate the spatial order with those who "fell speechless with delight" upon seeing the new designs? And how did the Soviets understand the new fixing of Polish time and space? Drawing on secondary literature and a small sample of archival documents, in this chapter I will examine these questions in the context of Soviet–Polish youth contacts during the first five years after the famous 20th Congress of the CPSU (The Communist

Party of the Soviet Union) in February 1956, during which Nikita Khrushchev attacked Stalin's policies and his cult of personality.

After 1956 the term "Polish road to socialism" was becoming awkward to the Polish authorities, who were eager to mend relations with the Soviets; after the return of the pro-Soviet but strong-willed Władysław Gomułka and in the atmosphere of widespread, open anti-Sovietism, referring to "that unfortunate road" rubbed the Soviets the wrong way.<sup>12</sup> Yet the fact remains that, although the USSR and Poland were becoming more connected through more vigorous tourist travel, student exchanges, and cultural contacts, the combination of Polish pull and Soviet push factors also caused the countries to drift apart. "What's the difference between Khrushchev and Gomułka?" Poles asked themselves jokingly in 1958. "In the USSR, the leader can say whatever he wants, but the society cannot," they answered, "whereas in Poland, it's the other way around."<sup>13</sup> Here I focus on what the drifting apart meant in spatial terms, to those who betrayed no amusement as they scrutinized "the Polish path": the Komsomol activists who visited Poland after 1956. In so doing, I explore the ways in which the Soviet-Polish spatial rift reflected political divergences, and therefore deeper structural contradictions within the Soviet Bloc, at this important political juncture.

### COMPARISONS: THE TWO "THAWS"

Scholars have compared Soviet Bloc countries largely in order to explain differences between them—for instance, their various degrees of "Sovietization," de-Stalinization or communist authorities' contrasting responses to crises.<sup>14</sup> But comparing communist contexts can also be useful for understanding the reactions of those people who traveled internationally within the socialist second world. The subsequent efforts to juxtapose Soviet and Polish "Thaws" is an attempt to construct what Clifford Geertz has called a "thick description," a way of "finding our feet" with the historical actors who lived in a world different than our own—in this case Komsomol activists who visited Poland between 1957 and 1964.<sup>15</sup>

Leopold Tyrmand was penning his scathing though private reviews of Warsaw's Stalinist cityscape in late winter of 1954. By early spring, the Soviet writer Ilya Ehrenburg published a critique of a bygone era that was cautious, but public. His novel *The Thaw* appeared in the famous journal *Novyi Mir*. The work both captivated and provoked the contemporaries with the unusually honest discussion of the hitherto taboo topic,

the shortcomings of Stalinism. In dividing the characters into Stalinist artists, old-timers, and party hacks on the one hand, and a younger generation of industrious engineers and activists, Ehrenburg struck a sensitive cord in Soviet society: *The Thaw* painted a picture of present conflicts that many found accurate, if convenient. The novel came out at a time when nobody could really know whether Soviet politics was heading. To some extent, therefore, Ehrenburg's work of fiction constituted a commentary on an unpleasant past and a hopeful anticipation of the future. The Soviet writer spoke with an optimism, which Tyrmand, in his personal forecasts, was unable to muster. Ehrenburg constructed through his novel a kind of liberal time, set in, and articulated through, the language of physical geography of the natural world—therefore, a chronotope in its own right. And although a work of fiction, filled with wishful thinking about the future, the appearance of *The Thaw* reflected a new period in the history of relations between the Soviet authorities and the Soviet society.

Moreover, that the novel appeared in different parts of the Soviet Bloc at different times foreshadowed a new kind of relations between socialist countries. Stephen Birtner has traced many distinct waves of liberalization under Nikita Khrushchev on Moscow's famed Arbat Street alone.<sup>16</sup> But in addition, in each country of the Soviet Bloc, "the Thaw" meant something else. Ehrenburg's book appeared in several East European translations and elites throughout the region used the metaphor. In the USSR, *The Thaw* offended the authorities who condemned the work and fired the chief editor of *Novyi Mir*. Anyone who looked over the Soviet-Polish border between 1953 and 1956 noticed the differences between seasons. The differences had many causes. They may have been small at times, but they were still significant. And anyone living under socialism had been perfectly trained to see them: when Vladimir Pomerantsev's "On Sincerity in Literature," an article moderately critical of socialist realism, appeared in *Novyi Mir* in December 1953, Polish writers read it as a green light to push for freedom of creative activity.<sup>17</sup> In the USSR, the frost lasted until February 1956, when Khrushchev criticized Stalinist methods, policies, and legacies, thus opening the floodgate and making possible a Picasso exhibition later that year.<sup>18</sup> Not so in Poland, where the Communists proved too weak, too divided, and in some cases too reluctant to counter the cultural challenge to Stalinism. By 1955, journalists and students in particular voiced their discontent and pushed the boundaries of what was possible to say, do, or show. Only the popular Władysław Gomułka, elected first secretary of the PZPR (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, or

Polish United Workers' Party) in October 1956, set certain limits. He was driven to do so by his commitment to communism, his apodictic character, and his fear of the Soviet tanks. Thus, the proper "Thaw" was ending in Poland by 1957, giving way to the anti-climax called "Little Stabilization"; in the USSR, after much anticipation and a false start, that year marked the beginning of the Thaw.

Despite the different vectors of change during the decade after 1956, a chasm separated the Soviet and Polish contexts. As they were thawing out, each country developed its own microclimate, and the Polish one was warmer still. Polish media offered a more thorough coverage of international events. Polish censors intervened less than their Soviet counterparts in domestic literary and artistic life. Polish artists, far less broken by the brutal but shorter and relatively milder Stalinist interlude than those in the USSR, retained strength, independence, and daring which the Soviets artists had lost. As a result, while the Soviet writers discussed the broadening of the definition of socialist realism in 1958, the Polish literati deleted all references to "the method" from their Union's statute. Poles enjoyed better access to Western culture than the Soviets. When historian Wiktorija Śliwowska and her husband René went to an exhibition of illegal art in Moscow, organized by friends of their friends in early 1960s they were surprised to see that the show's "greatest sensation," were "imitations of Paul Klee." These were not things "that these young artists could have seen" personally, unless they saw it in "the cheap, little French albums sold in Poland and often imported from us," the two reasoned, and their hosts seemed also embarrassed by the derivative nature of the displayed art.<sup>19</sup> The struggle against "revisionism," an official term of opprobrium for liberalization, took a more aggressive turn in the USSR than in Poland; while Stalin's name disappeared from official Polish narratives by the late 1950s, in the USSR it persisted into the late 1960s.<sup>20</sup> There were other reasons behind these political and cultural differences. Vladislav Zubok wrote of the 1990s that East European intellectuals and artists "had the luxury of pretending that the communist phase was not their own, that it had been imposed from outside," while "in Russia, few intellectuals and cultural figures could feel or think that way."<sup>21</sup> During the Thaw, it also mattered that while Poles found it relatively easy to reject the legacy of a regime imported from abroad, the Soviet citizens had to square accounts with self-inflicted pain.

The Soviet-Polish differential extended beyond the realm of ideas or consumer culture. In the wake of Stalin's death, the Polish and Soviet

authorities transformed their countries' spatial regimes. Here, too, they proceeded asymmetrically. Both Khrushchev and Gomułka put an end to the grand-style, decorative architecture of the Stalinist era and began promoting cheaper, more efficient designs, in part to solve each country's housing problems.<sup>22</sup> Major similarities ended here, however. According to the deal struck between the two leaders in October 1956, the Soviet Union would not interfere in Poland's domestic affairs. This gave the Polish communists a free hand in areas that many Poles deemed important. The new arrangement enabled the authorities to hammer out new terms with the Catholic Church, whose leaders promised not to interfere with politics in exchange for greater institutional freedoms. The Polish communists abolished collective farms, which stayed in the USSR and most other countries of the Soviet Bloc. They also allowed private farming. The Polish authorities liquidated the famous "shops behind yellow window curtains," in which members of the communist elite had been able to purchase otherwise unavailable goods at low prices.<sup>23</sup> At the same time, the communists relaxed the state monopoly on trade, allowing some people to open private shops; "hidden away in small lanes," they "sold all kinds of things," reported a reporter from *Ogoniek* in 1956 clearly aiming to mystify and intrigue his readers.<sup>24</sup> As Anne White has shown, Polish communists and activists, as well as the rural and urban populations, began to dismantle the Stalinist, state-sponsored, and highly centralized system of "cultural enlightenment"—a phenomenon absent in the USSR and somewhat slower even in Hungary before the mid-1960s. The Polish communists partly relinquished and partly lost control of the system's flagship propaganda institutions, such as "houses of culture" and rural reading rooms. As a result, these largely eviscerated venues together with the new ones, set up on the initiative from below, offered ample opportunities for the Polish population to engage in largely apolitical activities.<sup>25</sup>

Soviet and Polish private spaces in particular transformed at an uneven pace. In these years, the Soviet authorities did depart from the most violent Stalinist methods of coercion. But, as sociologist Oleg Kharkhordin has shown, they simultaneously intensified methods of "horizontal" social surveillance in order to increase control through augmenting a sense of collectivism in everyday life. The Soviet leaders emphasized the collective responsibility of teams of workers for discipline and productivity; they instituted "people's patrols" and "comrades' courts," whose members "surveyed, admonished and controlled" ordinary Soviet citizens who offended the socialist decorum through excessively individualistic

behavior or appearance. The result, Kharkhordin argues, was a regime that was less violent, but more efficient and effective than the Stalinist one, for "what the earlier uneven and frequently chaotic terror still allowed for was a space of uncompromised human freedom and dignity that the later orderly mutual surveillance erased."<sup>26</sup>

Gomulka's Poland differed in that respect. Even those who rightly acknowledge the first secretary's "totalitarian" leanings acknowledge his reluctance to "script" people's private lives. In the period of the "Little Stabilization," wrote eminent sociologist Hanna Świda-Ziemia, "during family or social meetings, and even (partially) during faculty meetings, scholarly societies or in the Clubs of the Catholic Intelligentsia, one could express all kinds of judgments that were critical of the political reality"; moreover, privately, "one could joke about the first secretary or the party itself (including in the presence of party members), complain about its current directives," and express hope for future improvement.<sup>27</sup> Perhaps one of the ironies of the period was that while the official discourse in the USSR at that time increasingly defined the Soviet identity around the vastness of spatial expanses, it was a small country such as Poland that offered people a little more space of their own.<sup>28</sup>

As a result, unlike in the USSR, Polish citizens living in the late 1950s and 1960s enjoyed the full mandate to think of their (state-owned) apartments as private spaces—areas outside of the state's authority to intervene. Comparing the two contexts, art historian David Crowley observed that as they "returned to Leninist principles," Soviet authorities emphasized modern functional designs and technological solutions rooted in Constructivism and the 1920s avant-garde in order to instill the home with the values of collective—read socialist—production and consumption. Not so in Poland where the popular press promoted the aesthetic of the modern home through "proto-consumerist discourses of individual taste and fashion."<sup>29</sup>

The Śliwowski couple also remembered noticing how the Soviet private space automatically challenged official Soviet values as soon as it departed from them. These "shy nudes" and abstract paintings had to be displayed secretly, even though the organizers had already confined the pieces to the private space of a newly built, still empty apartment. Moreover, the exhibition took place on the outskirts of the city, in what still resembled a construction site more than a finished residential area.<sup>30</sup> Through its remoteness, chaos, emptiness, and opacity, this unlit, muddy maze of unfinished Khrushchev-era apartment buildings provided another layer of safety from the all-intrusive Soviet state.

### SPACE EXPLORERS

Young people played leading roles in the carnival of the Thaws.<sup>31</sup> Yet hardly all youth expressed liberal leanings. Benjamin Tromly found that outside the small circles of radicals large sections of the Soviet youth hardly supported the ferment in Eastern Europe, much less drew inspiration from it. "Faced with the destabilization of the Bloc," he wrote, "many students, like other Soviet citizens, accepted with little hesitation the official explanation that the Hungarian 'events' constituted a counterrevolution that had to be put down by Soviet troops." In Tromly's view, "perhaps the majority" of the students "had a narrow, cratist vision of Soviet patriotism that was at odds with the internationally engaged socialism of the revisionists."<sup>32</sup> There had been Soviet and East European students engaged in verbal clashes in Soviet university hallways, as they exchanged views on the meaning of socialism and Soviet policies in Eastern Europe.<sup>33</sup> De-Stalinization "had led to solidarity and pan-bloc thinking"; but "the Hungarian events triggered a retreat from internationalism," Tromly argued, pointing to the popular attitudes.<sup>34</sup> The leaders of the Soviet youth organization Komsomol in particular resented many aspects of de-Stalinization.<sup>35</sup> Many lower-level Komsomol members shared their leaders' conservative views. They participated vigorously in the campaigns to define distinct Soviet values among youth in collective and often anti-Western terms.<sup>36</sup> The most conservative activists traveled to Eastern Europe, because they were considered most reliable. They would stay for a few days or weeks, at the most. This was little time, but they tried to understand Poland's transition from Stalinism to post-Stalinism by taking visual snapshots of Polish spaces.

Consider the case of the five students from the Azerbaijani Polytechnical Institute who spent 12 days in Poland in late December, 1960. They left Baku and the Transcaucasus slopes to "learn about the organization of mass work" among Polish students, to "tell" the Polish peers "about the successes of communist building in our country," and about the scientific, cultural, and educational achievements of Soviet Azerbaijan.<sup>37</sup> They voyaged to see sites that showcased the socialist Poland: Warsaw, the country's capital with its dominating Palace of Culture and Science; Wrocław, a city which the Poles, with Stalin's support, had "recovered" from Germany; the New Steel Mill, a massive settlement around the new industrial plant near Cracow; Poland's cultural capital and historically most conservative city; and Katowice, the coal mining city in the Lower Silesia.

The mountainous resort town of Zakopane, another stop on the agenda, lay nearby Poronin, where Lenin had spent part of his exile before 1917. The final stop was to be Auschwitz, the death camp which the Poles had been commemorating as a place of national martyrdom, and which Red Army soldiers had liberated in early 1945. Like Soviet tourists to Eastern Europe examined by Anne Gorsuch, they set off to visit "two kinds of Soviet past: the heroic past of revolutionary construction, a more recent Stalinist past," a process that reinforced the discourse of Soviet superiority.<sup>38</sup> But the youth activists also differed from Soviet tourists in showing keen interest in spaces that ostensibly marginalized Soviet agency, and played down the significance of socialist ideological precepts. Much more than "time travelers," they acted as "space explorers" of sorts.

Upon their arrival on December 24, the Baku students spent a quick evening in Warsaw and then relaxed for two days in the Zakopane, with its "picturesque" surroundings. Yet no urban vista and no mountain view stirred such surprise among the guests as the *interiors* of several cities' student clubs. In Cracow, they were to meet with representatives of Poland's Union of Polish Students in a venue called "Under the Lizards," named this way after the reptilian bas-relief on the façade of the Renaissance building that housed the club.<sup>39</sup> The leader of the Soviet delegation A. Fataliev described what he saw in his report:

The club operates several rooms on the ground and basement floors. The biggest room, one that could hold approximately three hundred people, is lined with small tables, at which [young people] drink coffee. The Club's Council also organizes rare mass events in this room.<sup>40</sup>

Fataliev was describing the "Gothic" room; just like in Wrocław's "Piwnica Świdnicka," another club they visited, the names and decors of the interiors evoked Poland's pre-industrial past.<sup>41</sup> The five youngsters then followed a "spiral staircase" into the basement, where they noticed a bar and "a special room for playing of a rather popular card game [called] bridge." The downstairs struck them with its peculiar atmosphere. "A near-dusk reigns in all rooms belonging to the club; they have been artificially divided into nooks with single tables, as it's been explained to us, for lovers and romantics," wrote Fataliev. "As a result of excessive consumption of cigarettes, in all the rooms hangs a cloud of smoke."<sup>42</sup>

Between the lines of this extensive description, Soviets articulated a palpable concern. They raised their eyebrows upon seeing that the Poles

had turned transparent, public spaces which should be serving the political cause of socialism into opaque, smoke-filled dens of personal pleasure and romantic intimacy. They soon learned that little political work had been going on in the club. Talking to a member of the club's Executive Committee, the Soviet students observed that "there's really no place to conduct section activities, because all rooms are already occupied." The "Polish comrades" answered somewhat lamely that they "would think of something."<sup>43</sup> In Fataliev's words, "our guys wondered: have there been organized meetings with factory workers, University professors, with older comrades? The response was: not yet."<sup>44</sup> Having scrutinized Polish spaces, the Soviets understandably began to raise questions about the ideological integrity of their hosts. And in defending themselves, the Poles only confirmed the Soviet suspicions.

Part of the Soviet effort to promote internationalism among the young, dozens of Soviet youth delegations visited Poland in the half-decade after 1956.<sup>45</sup> Each time, the Soviets paid keen attention to the spaces into which the Poles had brought them. Youth clubs in particular elicited in these guests a mixture of disapproval and disbelief. The Soviets complained that on the walls, the Poles put up few political slogans and plenty of abstract art. In the clubs' rooms, unstructured discussion over coffee took precedence over collective activities. Young Polish men and women smoked and gambled there. On Saturdays, they gathered in the clubs to listen to jazz and dance to rock-and-roll, although the popular culture spilled beyond the club walls. As one Komsomol activist pointed out after his trip to Poland in 1960, "in youth clubs and on stages Western music and dances dominate."<sup>46</sup> As the head of one Soviet delegation to Poland from late 1958, A. Torsuev observed, "most activists with whom we spoke approve the building of socialism in Poland, but they often emphasize the particularities of the Polish path." According to Torsuev, ZSP (Zrzeszenie Studentów Polskich or Polish Students' Association) student organizations "do not actively participate in the building of socialism" and "there's not a big cause which would bring concrete benefits to the party and the state, which would nourish its members." He characterized the activists as "generally passive... afraid to exert their influence, for instance in clubs, among the faithful, etc..."<sup>47</sup> Torsuev added that "a significant portion" of the activists believed that "they could connect with students only through entertainment and instructional work," while the pursuit of direct party-minded questions about socialism and its ideas "can frighten masses of students away from the clubs." Many activists, Torsuev opined, believe "that the best strategy

is to stay passive and observe"; according to them, "youth should come to understand socialist art, socialist aesthetics, et cetera, by themselves."<sup>48</sup>

Polish student clubs only seemed like natural places for Soviet–Polish youth meetings. They emerged as centers of the reinvigorated post-1956 student mass cultural movement, which put a premium on unconstrained sociability, experimentation and also various forms of entertainment. They were part of a network which also included discussion clubs that focused on highbrow cultural affairs, as well as student theaters, choirs, but also—after their fortunes have waned, or during slow seasons—night clubs and dance floors. They mushroomed in Poland's major cities and rapidly grew in number from nine in 1958 to 116 in 1965.<sup>49</sup> One ZSP activist called them "home to all anxious student minds," a place that "concentrates social, intellectual, and creative life, which poses questions and searches for answers." Their founders and participants consciously sought an alternative to the reading room model that prevailed before 1955, and which emphasized socialist education; they opposed the salons, with their strict rules of conduct; they wanted to create "a platform for intimate intellectual contact," a counter-space to "a political rally."<sup>50</sup> Soviets saw them as insufficiently political. But in reality, they reflected a more capacious idea of politics. "Political," noted authors of a 1968 almanac summarizing post-1956 student cultural achievements, meant not "ideological verbiage, skin-deep engagement, speaking out loud about obvious things"; but rather: "an ability to keep up pace with the issues of the day," for example, "finding thought and artistic formulas to the postulates put forth by cultural policy."<sup>51</sup> The youth followed the party line, promoting "democratic" culture, popular engagement, creativity, and critical reflection about life and society. In the previous era—and now, to some Komsomol activists—"democratic" meant simplifying, finding the lowest common denominator. Explicitly breaking with such a practice, Polish students aimed to democratize culture by popularizing elite forms of artistic expression.

Fundamentally, the Soviet–Polish differences over club spaces reflected the uneven transformations in the respective countries' youth organizations. The Soviet Komsomol remained a unitary, monopolistic youth organization. During the intellectual ferment of 1956 the organization opened student clubs and then shut them down when they departed from their traditional role as "mediums of socialist socialization," and turned into "physical and discursive space" which students used "to push for deepening de-Stalinization—and to affirm their identities as critical thinkers in

the process."<sup>52</sup> Lacking institutional space to socialize on their own terms, Soviet youth embraced *kompanii*—informal groups of friends who spent time together anywhere and everywhere.<sup>53</sup>

In Poland, the Stalinist youth organization, the ZMP (*Zmiazek Młodzieży Polskiej* or Polish Youth Association), fell apart in early 1957; behind the decision to dissolve it stood both its activist members who felt disenchanting by the extremely instrumental way with which the organization treated its card holders, as well as upper echelon party members who wished to distance themselves from the previous epoch.<sup>54</sup> Several youth organizations replaced the ZMP. One was the ZMS (*Zmiazek Młodzieży Socjalistycznej* or Socialist Youth Association), which reached out to primarily urban youth. It emerged from the post-1956 upheavals as an organization most closely tied to the Party, but which was characterized, until 1964, by internal divisions and a fair amount of institutional autonomy.<sup>55</sup> Another was the ZSP, which catered to Polish university students. The Soviet authorities frowned upon this Polish departure from the Leninist model of a unitary youth organization. The Polish communists made the case that despite the divisions, the ideological unity within youth institutions had been preserved.<sup>56</sup> But reality failed to live up to such assertions. Even the ostensibly political ZMS sought to attract members by minimizing the discredited, and often abhorred, forms of "political training," and by focusing on engaging them through culture, arts, and entertainment, and also by addressing social needs of youth, such as stipends, vacations, and foreign internships.<sup>57</sup> At the universities, the ZSP exercised its competitive advantage over the ZMS by attending to the students' daily needs. For that reason, the ZSP emerged as the more popular organization.<sup>58</sup> Unlike Soviet authorities with regards to the Komsomol, the Polish communists welcomed a degree of apoliticism within the student body, justifiably fearing that discussions might backfire and turn into criticism very quickly.<sup>59</sup> The ZMS or the Komsomol were considered boring.<sup>60</sup> But the ZSP had no such troubles. The ZSP ran the student clubs. The ZSP was far more fun.

Space, therefore, reflected the political strategy of the Polish activists. And the Poles defended it with defiance against Soviet critics. In 1960, the delegates from Baku who visited another club in Wrocław "expressed their perfectly justified incredulity at [the organizations'] negligence of visual agitation in the club, and the weak organization of educational /*воспитательной*/ work in the club." Especially Kulski, the secretary of the *voivodship* committee of ZMS, objected to such reprimands. "He said that

if we hung up on the wall a portrait of an exemplary worker, or talk about him, tomorrow everybody will laugh at (!) him." And then, the Pole added, "where the guarantee that tomorrow that same worker will not be doing a worse job, and then we will be in trouble."<sup>61</sup> The temperature of the meeting went up the moment one Soviet student asked, "isn't there too much dance and bridge?" To this, visibly irritated Kulski responded: "And what would you want instead, a political circle?" Kulski may have been right, but he also misrepresented the exact nature of Soviet demands with typical post-Stalinist sarcasm.

The Soviets welcomed cultural diversity, but they also wanted to see Polish comrades firmly in control. Another Wrocław student club called Little Palace (*Pałacik*) impressed Fataliev, because it was "organized differently."<sup>62</sup> Through offering various activities, section leaders provided the club with both the necessary energy and structure. Yes, there was the "the Club of Political Thought"; but the attending students met not only with party *apparatchiks* but also with journalists and other professionals who discussed their work. The Club organized thematic lecture series, such as the ones devoted to Africa. During one of the first meetings, noted Fataliev approvingly, "the journalist Kapuściński came and discussed his impressions from this continent." What could have that been like? Ryszard Kapuściński later became famous for his beautiful, riveting reportages from the war-torn areas of the Third World. In his early twenties, as late as 1958, and on the cusp of the enormous popular interest in the exotic, postcolonial world, he was still finding his voice—often through embarrassing references to "some kind of Sudan," the "savage country" of Afghanistan, and through his support for British colonial policies in Ghana.<sup>63</sup> But by 1960, the time when the Little Palace began functioning, Africa had grown on Kapuściński and Kapuściński himself had matured. He traded his naïve pro-capitalism—perhaps a reaction to discredited Stalinism, which he himself had embraced—for a passionate curiosity about the Third World as a terrain of anti-colonial struggle, a political unknown, and a possible hope for socialist renewal. During countless meetings with students and the general public he disabused his listeners of simplistic and racist notions about the faraway lands he had embraced only a few months before.<sup>64</sup> This is the Kapuściński Fataliev would have heard about. The Soviet activist was pleased that the Cinema Discussion Club featured films by Eisenstein and Pudovkin. In short, they wanted the clubs to explore the world in a much less heavy-handed way than the Poles made it out to be; but it had to be the world that affirmed

Soviet values, in which socialism was victorious and sacrosanct. In order to promote such a mission, clubs had to offer suitable spaces.

One after another, Soviet youth delegations voiced their discomfort with de-Stalinized Polish spaces. Young Soviet women who visited Poland in 1958 to attend a congress observed that "during visits to industrial sites, kindergartens, schools we saw not a single slogan, poster, commitment; elements of any kind of competition are completely absent." This, stated the delegation's leader M. S. Garkhusha in her report, "creates the impression that workers do not know what they strive for, they live for today only."<sup>65</sup> Lithuanian Komsomol activists visiting Poland in 1959 also emphasized that any visual agitation targeting youth in industrial plants and factories was "completely missing."<sup>66</sup> That same delegation visited the Auschwitz concentration camp a few days later; it struck them that informational brochures were available in Polish, German, and English but not in Russian. Then on May 10, the Lithuanian group paid a visit to the Soviet cemetery in Gdańsk. Nothing betrayed the passing of the all-important Victory Day the day before: "at midday, when we headed for the cemetery, the gates were closed and locked; on the graveyard, there were no people, not a single bunch of flowers, not even from the Soviet consulate in Gdańsk."<sup>67</sup> De-Stalinization was about re-appropriating spaces just as much as it was about creating new openings and closures.

The youngest generations of Polish youth likewise re-appropriated space. In July 1960, a Komsomol delegation which attended an all-Polish Congress of Youth made it an occasion to visit five camps of Polish scouts. The Soviets noticed that "the scouts attach considerable weight to symbolism," and so each tent, in each group has its own name, which the boys or girls choose by themselves. They pointed to the Little Bears unit of which each member "carries a figure of a little bear on a rope; at the entrance to a tent lays an emblem with the head of a bear from sand, rocks and tree cones."<sup>68</sup> But they saw the most stunning things in the camp near Mielno, close to the Baltic Sea. "In the 'café' constructed by the kids from blocks/stools and boards/desks, right at the entrance there stands something incomprehensible, made of bits of wires, stones, bones and wood." The guests from the Komsomol asked about the significance of the strange sculpture. The Poles explained that this is "the Man of the future—a robot; he stands there to invite everyone to the café, instead of a real human being; the long branches with blue wire isolations symbolize hands; they are extended towards the entrance, in the gesture of invitation for the passerby." In the report to Moscow, the Soviets used this

example to illustrate the extent to which the work of the Scouts relied on "entertainment, romanticism and adventurism," clearly elements that distinguished the Polish from the Soviet style.<sup>69</sup>

Unlike under Stalin, the members of the Soviet youth delegations to Poland rarely felt entitled to enforce the imperial chronotope. But they actively looked for signs of its maintenance and survival. The Soviet female delegates who attended the 1958 Women's Congress later wrote that "it caught our attention that during none of the meetings with youth from the countryside did we meet a young man or a woman from a collective farm, although we tried to, and during each meeting we asked about the place of work." Such interviews proved disappointing, for "unfortunately, the answer was always: 'I work for myself.'<sup>70</sup> The author of the report added that out of Poland's 10,000 agricultural cooperatives only 1800 remained after 1956. To those Soviet travelers who sought in the Polish spaces a confirmation of Soviet values, this was bad news. Members of another Komsomol delegation repeatedly approached Polish students by asking about what they were proud of in their country. They asked: "which one of the achievements of People's Poland makes you particularly proud?" Someone from Cracow mentioned the Royal Castle. One respondent from Łódź cited the 1905 weavers' revolt. Most people, however, were unable to give any answer. "Above all, we were disappointed by the absence in our interlocutors of any pride in the achievements of today's People's Republic of Poland," concluded the trip leader despondently.<sup>71</sup>

In certain cases, the Poles consciously crafted their own chronotope by showing the Soviets some sites and deliberately hiding others; and in some instances, the Soviets aggressively demanded exposure to their own, preferred vision of Poland. One male Komsomol activist who came from Uzbekistan with a group of Soviet tourists in June 1958 complained that "during our six-day stay in Poland, we visited not a single industrial enterprise." Avasenov had been hoping to see "Nowa Huta," or the "New Steel Mill," Poland's first socialist city. Built around the newly constructed Lenin Steel Mill near Cracow, it was Poland's response to Soviet Komsomol and Magnitogorsk; far larger than any such project in the USSR or Eastern Europe, it was to be "a city of labor and progress, inhabited by 'new men' full of faith in socialism and the future."<sup>72</sup> He was disappointed. "They showed [it to] us from a distance of 500 meters; as a result, we saw only parts of furnaces and factory chimneys. [...] Łódź, one of Poland's major industrial centers, was not included in the program at all." In contrast, commented R. Avasenov with a bitter passion, the

Poles "delighted in showing us a good dozen churches—some on a hill, some on the ground, some underground—many of which," he opined, "represent neither historical nor artistic value."<sup>73</sup> This may have been true. After 1956, Poles scrambled to build new churches not only to create places of worship but also to challenge the communist authorities at the same time.<sup>74</sup> Showing the churches to the Soviets, too, was a way of flaunting a post-Stalinist present. With considerable difficulty, Avasenov convinced the guides to take the group to the Lenin museum in Cracow; the Poles complied "very reluctantly," but then "in the museum dragged their feet."<sup>75</sup> The young man reached his fill and personally went to the Polish travel agency "Orbis" to file a grievance as a Komsomol activist; but there, the employees reminded Avasenov that he was visiting Poland as a tourist, not a representative of a youth organization, and refused to help him.<sup>76</sup> Avasenov no longer enjoyed the clout that Soviet visitors to Eastern Europe enjoyed under Stalin. But some countries honored the Soviet presence more than others. Shortly thereafter, Avasenov visited Czechoslovakia and found the host much more accommodating.<sup>77</sup> "There are people in Orbis," he concluded in words that echoed the previous era, "who sabotaged our attempts to become familiar with the life of the Polish people; for that reason, we were unable to see that, for which we had come to Poland in the first place: the ways in which the Polish people builds socialism."<sup>78</sup>

Avasenov sounded like a Komsomol fanatic; however, his organization's correspondence with the USSR's tourist agency Inturist shows that indeed, the Poles deliberately manipulated the Soviets' spatial experience. In 1957, the Cracovians took the conservative Soviet literary critic to one of the student clubs, whose program, unsurprisingly, he deemed offensive.<sup>79</sup> Writing in early August 1958, Inturist's deputy chair A. Erokhin informed the Komsomol's Central committee that they were negotiating with the Poles "the possible inclusion of industrial and agricultural sites into the tour programs." But the Poles insisted that "they are not ready yet, although they are willing to return to this question later."<sup>80</sup> Others also voiced frustrations. Another delegation of Soviet women who visited Poland in February–March 1961 reported that "during the tours of historical places in Warsaw, Cracow, [the Poles] speak little about the revolutionary or working-class traditions." In Cracow, the Komsomol activists spent "much of the time touring old monuments, churches, especially Wawel, with the tombs of the Polish kings." They found guides' comments about Piłsudski's role



to be “tendentious,” and seemed surprised that on the Marshall’s tomb there were “always fresh flowers.” When they inquired about “how to explain the nation’s ‘love’ for Płsudski,” one top Cracow district official explained “Alas, Płsudski is to Poland what Lenin is to Russia. Except that Płsudskii was a reactionary.”<sup>81</sup> The Soviets measured the Polish politics of space by the rules of Marxist–Leninist geometry; in their minds, by enshrining Płsudski in the revolutionary canon, the Poles tried to square a circle.

### CONCLUSION

It has become an axiom in recent historiography that space and society co-produce each other.<sup>82</sup> In the 1940s, the landscapes and interiors did more than serve as a backdrop to political and social consolidation of the Stalinist Empire. During the period of de-Stalinization, too, space more than simply contained Soviet–Polish contestation of ideas. On the contrary, it reflected a new stage in Soviet–Polish relations, which, in turn, unveiled ruptures within the Second World. Space also shaped patterns of mid-level crossborder interactions. To the Komsomol activists, the Polish management of space immediately revealed differences between political paths taken. This perceptible chasm prompted further discussions about social policies of the youth organizations and political strategies of the Polish communists. This in turn put into relief deeper divisions between Polish and Soviet activists concerning the ways in which to engage youth in the building of socialism.

Many Poles relished their newfound empowerment vis-à-vis the Soviets. They showed their guests around places and spaces that were unlikely to elicit Soviet enthusiasm, but which reflected the hosts’ own values and identities. Some Polish youth activists shared the Soviet opinions about excessive divisions within and autonomy of Polish youth organization. They felt somewhat embarrassed about the “revisionist” trends in Polish society—which they compared to pneumonia—in contrast to the Stalinist “cold.”<sup>83</sup> But the persistence with which many other Polish guides refused to honor orthodox Soviet sensibilities testified to the resentment against Moscow’s policies of the preceding decade. The Polish sense of confidence also clearly reflected their conviction, only rarely shared by the opposite side, that now the Soviets should be learning from the Poles. As the young Polish writer Igor Abramow-Newerly told his Soviet hosts when he arrived with a delegation of students in 1957, the Komsomol,

like the ZMP, would “inevitably” undergo a breakup as well, just as the USSR needed its own “October.”<sup>84</sup> But in contesting the post-1956 chronotope, Soviet and Polish youth activists contested the proper shape of the socialist future.

What could these experiences in Polish spaces have meant to the Komsomol activists? In 1945, the Polish writer Czesław Miłosz read “compassionate *superiority*” comparable to the feeling of a housewife for “a mouse caught in her trap” in the smile of the elderly Soviet journalist who visited Poland and toured several provincial cities. Miłosz sensed that the man “was flattered to be a representative of a country ruled according to infallible predictions; for nation after nation had indeed become part of its Empire, according to schedule.”<sup>85</sup> The disruption of the schedule appears to have piqued the pride of the Soviets. Komsomol activists saw Poland’s changing interior landscapes as a symbol of their country’s power; now, the Poles’ unwillingness to imitate things Soviet, and the Soviet inability to force the Poles into the Soviet “stairwell to communism,” caused humiliation. Paradoxically, the Komsomol activists’ impulses to stop the transformation of Polish spaces may have had something to do with their organization’s growing alienation back home. The Komsomol leadership resented the seemingly fast pace of Khrushchevian de-Stalinization, and the antipathy was, to some extent, mutual. The Komsomol proved increasingly unpopular with the Soviet youth as well; poems about collective farms, which the organization promoted as a panacea to indifference, hardly moved these young men and women who had access to rock-and-roll. In a very different context, David Cannadine has argued that nineteenth-century British colonial officials valued the empire’s overseas domains because they offered opportunities to underscore one’s social status through ceremony and display, for example, in a way that was becoming anachronistic—and therefore increasingly unavailable—at home.<sup>86</sup> Could it have been that the Soviet activists also yearned to re-create a different kind of vanishing world?

This chapter began with an attempt to identify the distinct spatial arrangements in the post-Stalinist USSR and Poland through the conceptual prism of the Bakhtinian “chronotope.” But perhaps the work of Henri Lefebvre may serve as a more useful starting point for considering the ways in which these distinct spatial orders interacted with each other within the framework of broader structures of power. In his classic neo-Marxist *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre examined the ways in which spatial arrangements characteristic of capitalism both embody and

generate systemic conflicts, or “contradictions.” Of note is the tension between two tendencies. The first is capitalism’s “strategy” to appropriate space, subordinate it to narrow, functional use, force it to serve the profit-making interests of the dominant classes, and homogenize it into an “abstract space” filled with “banks, business centres, and major productive entities,” as well as “motorways, airports, and information lattices.”<sup>87</sup> The second is the grassroots struggle to carve out “counter-spaces,” such as “amenities” or empty spaces for play and encounter; “deviant or diverted spaces” which challenge the status quo by reflecting broader social interest and introducing heterogeneity.<sup>88</sup> The Soviet youth activists and their Polish counterparts similarly contested different spatial regimes within the perimeter of a certain political, cultural, and social whole. Yet to the extent that each spatial order stemmed from the half-hearted and somewhat vague top-level consensus among the communists that the Poles could ascend their own stairway to socialism, the conflicts over space point to the continued difficulty with which socialism after Stalin reconciled cultural flexibility with control.

## NOTES

1. It was a gift that even the Polish communists failed to appreciate, for, as David Crowley observed, “it was more like a tribute to a king than a gift to a people.” See *Warsaw*, 40, 42.
2. Tyrmand, *Diary*, 201.
3. *Ibid.*, 202. He was hardly alone. A student delegation to the Ukraine told the Soviet hosts that the building “cost the Polish society too much,” and that it “spoiled Warsaw’s architectural harmony.” RGASPI, f. 1M, op. 30, d. 36, l. 15.
4. Tyrmand, *Diary*, 202.
5. *Ibid.*, 203.
6. *Ibid.*, 205.
7. *Ibid.*, 203.
8. Rubnov, “Zapiski,” 410.
9. As found by Gorsuch, “Time Travelers,” 213.
10. Bakhtin, “Forms of Time,” 84.
11. Clark, “Socialist Realism,” 9.
12. Rakowski, *Dzienniki polityczne*, vol. 1, 35, entry for August 24, 1957. On the social history of 1956 in Poland, see Machewicz, *Rebellious Satellite*.
13. Rakowski, *Dzienniki polityczne 1958–1962*, 23. Entry for June 2, 1957.
14. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc*; White, *De-Stalinization*; Ekiert, *The State Against Society*; Connelly, *Captive University*; and Behrends, *Die erfundene Freundschaft*.
15. Geertz, “Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture.”
16. Bitner, *The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw*. For an interesting analysis of East-West literary politics during that time, see also Jones, “The Thaw Goes International.”
17. Kozlov, *The Readers of Nowy Mir*, 55.
18. On this episode, see Gilburd, “Picasso in Thaw Culture.”
19. Śliwowski and Śliwowski, *Rosja*, 230.
20. On the USSR, see Jones, *Myth, Memory, Trauma*, 11; on Poland, see Kupiecki, *Narodził się milioner*.
21. Zubok, *Zhigago’s Children*, 357.
22. On Poland, see Crowley, “Warsaw Interiors,” 193; on USSR, see Harris, *Communism on Tomorrow Street*.
23. Świada-Ziemba, *Młodzież PRL*, 243, 263.
24. Cited in Gorsuch, “Time Travelers,” 218.
25. White, *De-Stalinization*, esp. 45–68, 78.
26. Kharkhordin, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia*, 303. In contrast, Vladimir Shlapentokh found a growing “privatization” of life in post-Stalinist USSR. Drawing mostly on the examples from the 1970s and 1980s, he pointed to such evidence as the growth of private property among Soviet citizens, the increased role of the family and friends as means of disengagement from the state, and the pervasive practice of lying as a way to defend one’s privacy against state incursions. But these phenomena often contradicted state policies and often developed precisely as responses to the state attempts to control the individuals, and are, therefore, largely consistent with the findings of Kharkhordin. See Shlapentokh, *Public and Private Life*, 153–189. Interestingly, Kharkhordin’s conclusions echo those of White, *De-Stalinization*, 38.
27. Świada-Ziemba, *Młodzież PRL*, 327, developing ideas of Aleksander Smolar, “Czy 13. XII. 1981 Polska była państwem totalitarnym?”
28. On the spatial discourse in the 1960s USSR, see Turoma, “Imperium Re/Constructed.”
29. Crowley, “Warsaw Interiors,” 195–6. Susan E. Reid also locates the Soviet apartment after the mid-1950s within the state campaign

- to promote collective values. Reid's analysis supports Kharkhordin's thesis, with which she engages directly; but she also finds that despite the pressure from above, Soviet citizens found ways of "privatizing" their living spaces through decoration and handiwork. See "The Meaning of Home."
30. Śliwowski and Śliwowski, *Rosja*, 228–230.
  31. Lygo, "The Need for New Voices," 194–195.
  32. Tromly, "Re-imagining," 294, and idem, *Making the Soviet Intelligentsia*.
  33. Tromly, "Re-imagining," 295; see also idem, "Brother or Other?"
  34. On p. 295 of "Re-imagining" Tromly cites one Russian interviewee's opinion that some 95% of Soviet students "saw nothing wrong with the suppression of the Hungarian revolution." Yet on the official level, 1956 coincided with the more vigorous engagement with the broader world, a circumstance that supports this volume's argument that there existed various types of internationalism.
  35. Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation*, 342–365.
  36. Kharkhordin, *The Collective*, 290.
  37. RGASPI, f. 1M, op. 30, d. 211, l. 10.
  38. Gorsuch, "Time Travelers," 213.
  39. Dziędzic, *Monografia*, 14.
  40. RGASPI, f. 1M, op. 30, d. 211, l. 11.
  41. On Piwnica Świdnicka, see RGASPI, f. 1M, op. 30, d. 211, l. 20.
  42. RGASPI, f. 1M, op. 30, d. 211, ll. 11–12.
  43. RGASPI, f. 1M, op. 30, d. 211, l. 12.
  44. RGASPI, f. 1M, op. 30, d. 211, l. 12.
  45. A cursory discussion of the Komsomol's role in the promotion of internationalism in 1959–65 can be found in the extensive though self-congratulatory account by an editorial team led by the Komsomol secretary Tiazhel'nikov, *Slawnyi put'*, vol. 2, 493–504.
  46. RGASPI, f. 1M, op. 30, d. 180, l. 16.
  47. RGASPI, f. 1M, op. 30, d. 36, l. 42.
  48. RGASPI, f. 1M, op. 30, d. 36, l. 45.
  49. The entire network of institutions grew from 79 in 1957 to 405 in 1968. ZMS and ZMW (Związek Młodzieży Wiejskiej, or Rural Youth Association) ran but a handful of similar youth clubs. See Walczak, *Ruch studencki*, 210.
  50. Ibid., 210; Dziędzic, *Monografia*, 7, 10.
  51. Sandecki and Leszin, *Almanach*, 7.
  52. Tromly, "Re-imagining," 253.

53. Ibid., 253, 289; Fürst, "Friends in Private;" and Zubok, *Zimnogo's Children*, 48–51.
54. Sadowska, *Serewm i myślą*, 49–50.
55. On divisions, and aspirations of autonomy, even within the growing trend to subordinate the ZMS to the party which culminated in 1964, see Sadowska, *Serewm i myślą*, 73–84, 93–98, 191.
56. Ibid., 70. On p. 89, Sadowska further points out that during its First Congress on April 25–26, 1957, Moscow tried to change the language of the programmatic declaration of the ZMS through one of the delegates. In the document, the ZMS cut itself off from Stalinism; the Soviets wanted to see Stalinism defined precisely. They failed to make the changes which, as Sadowska suggests, testifies to "the delegates' sense of independence."
57. Ibid., 211, 326–328.
58. In the 2nd half of 1959 about 7% of students (about 7000) belonged to the ZMS; in 1960, 74% of students belonged to the ZSP. Ibid., 313, 325.
59. Environmental historians have introduced the term "rewilding" to capture the process whereby people—policymakers, regional officials, national park authorities, and environmental groups—work together to restore the pristine natural state of a given territory. In social terms, the Polish communists were doing something similar. On "rewilding," see Cronon, "The Riddle."
60. Tromly observed that Komsomol meetings also became "formal and managed," "looking to the past rather than the future," producing a gap between top activists and rank-and-file members and decreased participation. See Tromly, "Re-imagining the Soviet Intelligentsia," 304–305. For examples of such ways of engaging the youth, see, e.g., Tiazhel'nikov, *Slawnyi put'* and the more recent, but equally uncritical, account by Kuznetsov, *Komsomol*.
61. RGASPI, f. 1M, op. 30, d. 211, l. 21.
62. On Palacyk see Michalewicz, *Palacyk*.
63. Domosławski, *Kapusiński*, 144–45.
64. Ibid., 155.
65. RGASPI, f. 1M, op. 30, d. 93, l. 133.
66. RGASPI, f. 1M, op. 30, d. 137, l. 5.
67. RGASPI, f. 1M, op. 30, d. 137, l. 10.
68. RGASPI, f. 1M, op. 30, d. 180, ll. 48–49.
69. RGASPI, f. 1M, op. 30, d. 180, l. 49.

70. RGASPI, f. IM, op. 30, d. 193, l. 132.
71. RGASPI, f. IM, op. 30, d. 180, l. 16. In her memoirs, Polish historian Wiktoria Śliwowska described her experience with a delegation of generals from the Soviet Military Historical Institute, who attended a conference in Warsaw on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II. Debating whether it was worth visiting Cracow, one of the generals replied: "Yes, there are two houses in which Lenin had lived over there." Śliwowski and Śliwowski, *Rosja*, 169.
72. Lebow, *Unfinished Utopia*, 2.
73. RGASPI, f. IM, op. 30, d. 93, l. 64.
74. On the dramatic efforts to build a church in Nowa Huta, see Lebow, *Unfinished Utopia*, 161–69.
75. RGASPI, f. IM, op. 30, d. 93, l. 65.
76. RGASPI, f. IM, op. 30, d. 93, l. 65.
77. RGASPI, f. IM, op. 30, d. 93, l. 66.
78. RGASPI, f. IM, op. 30, d. 93, l. 66.
79. Rakowski, *Dzienniki*, vol. 1, 181, entry for February 17, 1957.
80. RGASPI, f. IM, op. 30, d. 93, l. 67.
81. RGASPI, f. IM, op. 30, d. 180, l. 36.
82. Warf and Arias, "Introduction"; "Introduction: Russian Space," in Bassin, Ely, and Stockdale, *Space, Place, and Power*, and Turoma and Waldstein, *Empire De/Centered*, 16.
83. Świda-Ziemba, *Młodzież PRL*, 270.
84. RGASPI, f. IM, op. 30, d. 36, l. 15; on cases of Soviet youth sympathy with that view, see Tromly, "Re-imagining the Soviet Intelligentsia," 278–9.
85. Miłosz, *The Captive Mind*, 21. Italics there.
86. Cannadine, *Ornamentalism*, 8.
87. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 53.
88. *Ibid.*, 381–382, 383.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1991. "Forms of Time and of the Literary Chronotope." In *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, ed. Michael Holquist, and Caryl Emerson, 84–258. Austin: University of Texas Press.
2. Bassin, Mark, Christopher Ely, and Melissa K. Stockdale (ed.). 2010. *Space, Place, and Power in Modern Russia: Essays in the New Spatial History*. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press.

3. Behrends, Jan C. 2006. *Die erfundene Freundschaft: Propaganda für die Sowjetunion in Polen und in der DDR (1944–1957)*. Köln: Bohlau Verlag.
4. Bittner, Stephen. 2008. *The Many Lives of Khrushchev's Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow's Arbat*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
5. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1967. *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, 2nd edn. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
6. Bubnov, Nikolai S. "Zapiski voennogo redaktora," Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, f. 8127, Papers of N. S. Bubnov.
7. Cannadine, David. 2001. *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire*. New York: Oxford University Press.
8. Clark, Katerina. 2003. "Socialist Realism and the Sacralizing of Space." In *The Landscape of Stalinism: The Art and Ideology of Soviet Space*, ed. Evgeny Dobrenko, and Eric Naiman, 3–18. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
9. Connolly, John. 2000. *Captive University: The Sovietization of East Germany, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945–1956*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
10. Cronon, William. 2003, May–June. "The Riddle of the Apostle Islands." *Orion*, 36–42.
11. Crowley, David. 2002. "Warsaw Interiors: The Public Life of Private Spaces." In *Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc*, ed. David Crowley, and Susan Reid, 181–206. New York: Berg.
12. ———. 2003. *Warsaw*. London: Reaktion.
13. Domosławski, Artur. 2010. *Kapusiński non-fiction*. Warsaw: Świat Książki.
14. Działdziej, Stanisław. 1980. *Monografia klubu Pod Jaszczurami*. Cracow: Ogólnopolska Rada Klubow Studenckich.
15. Ekiert, Grzegorz. 1996. *The State Against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
16. Fürst, Juliane. 2006. "Friends in Private, Friends in Public: The Phenomenon of *Kompania* Among Soviet Youth in the 1950s and 1960s." In *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia*, ed. Lewis H. Siegelbaum, 229–250. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
17. ———. 2010. *Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
18. Geertz, Clifford. 1973. "Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture." In *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, 3–30. New York: Basic Books.
19. Gilburd, Elonory. 2006. "Picasso in Thaw Culture." *Cahiers du Monde russe* 47(1–2): 65–108.
20. Gorsuch, Anne E. 2006. "Time Travelers: Soviet Tourists in Eastern Europe." In *Tourism: The Russian and East European Tourist under Capitalism and Socialism*, ed. Anne Gorsuch, and Diane Koenker, 205–226. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

21. Harris, Steven. 2013. *Communism on Tomorrows Street: Mass Housing and Everyday Life after Stalin*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center and Johns Hopkins University Press.
22. Jones, Polly. 2013. *Myth, Memory, Trauma: Rethinking the Stalinist Past in the Soviet Union, 1953–70*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
23. ———. 2013. "The Thaw Goes International: Soviet Literature in Translation and Transit in the 1960s." In *The Socialist Sixties: Crossing Borders in the Second World*, ed. Anne E. Gorsuch, and Diane Koenker, 121–147. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
24. Kharkordin, Oleg. 1999. *The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
25. Kozlov, Denis. 2013. *The Readers of Nopyt Mir: Coming to Terms with the Stalinist Past*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
26. Kupiecki, Robert. 1993. *Narodzenie milionow: Kult Jozefa Stalina w Polsce*. Warsaw: WSP.
27. Kuznetsov, V.N. 2006. *Komsomol v zakrytom gorode. Oberki istorii. Dokumenty. Vospominaniia*. Akademiia Voennno-Istoricheskikh Nauk, Ural'skoe Ordeleenie: Ekaterinburg.
28. Lebow, Katherine. 2013. *Unfinished Utopia: Nowa Huta, Stalinism, and Polish Society, 1949–56*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
29. Lefebvre, Henri. 1991. *The Production of Space* (transl. Donald Nicholson-Smith). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
30. Lygo, Emily. 2006. "The Need for New Voices: Writers' Union Policy Towards Young Writers 1953–64." In *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era*, ed. Polly Jones, 193–208. New York: Routledge.
31. Machcewicz, Pawel. 2009. *Rebellious Satellite: Poland, 1956*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
32. Michalewicz, Janusz. 2012. *Patatyk pełen kultury: Klub jakiej pamiętam*. Wrocław: Comex.
33. Miłosz, Czesław. 1990. *The Captive Mind* (trans: Jane Zielonko). New York: Vintage International.
34. Rakowski, Mieczysław F. 1995. *Dzienniki polityczne vol. 1, 1958–1962*. Warsaw: Iskry.
35. Reid, Susan E. 2006. "The Meaning of Home: The Only Bit of the World You Can Have to Yourself." In *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia*, ed. Lewis H. Siegelbaum, 145–170. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
36. Sadowska, Joanna. 2010. *Serwem i myślą zwiążani z Partią. Związki Młodzieży Socjalistycznej, 1957–1976*. Warsaw: TRIO.
37. Sandeck, Włodzimierz, and Jerzy Leszcin (ed.). 1968. *Almanach ruchu kulturalnego i artystycznego ZSP*. Warsaw: ZSP.
38. Shapentokh, Vladimir. 1989. *Public and Private Life of the Soviet People: Changing Values in Post-Stalin Era*. New York: Oxford University Press.
39. Śliwowski, Wiktoria, and René Śliwowski. 2008. *Rosja: nasza miłość*. Warsaw: Iskry.
40. Smolar, Aleksander. 2006. "Czy 13. XII 1981 Polska była państwem totalitarnym?" *Przeгляд polityczny* 79(80): 193–197.
41. Świda-Zienba, Hanna. 2010. *Młodzież PRL: portrety pokoleń w kontekście historii*. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie.
42. Trazhel'nikov, E.M. 1974. *Slavnyi put' leninskogo Komsomola*, vol 2. Molodiata Gvardia: Moscow.
43. Tromly, Benjamin. 2007. "Re-imagining the Soviet Intelligentsia: Student Politics and University Life, 1948–1964." Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University.
44. ———. 2013. *Making the Soviet Intelligentsia: Universities and Intellectual Life under Stalin and Khrushchev*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
45. ———. 2014. "Brother or Other? East European students in Postwar Soviet Education." *European History Quarterly* 44(1): 80–102.
46. Turoma, Sanna, and Maxim Waldstein. 2013. *Empire De/Centered: New Spatial Histories of Russia and the Soviet Union*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
47. Turoma, Sanna. 2013. "Imperia Re/Constructed: Narratives of Space and Nation in 1960s Soviet Russian Culture." In *Empire De/Centered: New Spatial Histories of Russia and the Soviet Union*, ed. Sanna Turoma, and Maxim Waldstein, 239–256. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
48. Tyrmand, Leopold. 2014. *Diary 1954* (trans: Antra Shelton and A. J. Wrobel-Evanston). IL: Northwestern University Press.
49. Walczak, Jan. 1990. *Ruch Studencki w Polsce, 1944–1984*. Wrocław: Ossolineum.
50. Warf, Barney, and Santa Arias. 2009. "Introduction: the Reinsertion of Space in the Humanities and Social Sciences." In *The Spatial Turn. Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, ed. Barney Warf, and Santa Arias, 1–10. New York: Routledge.
51. White, Anne. 1990. *De-Stalinization and the House of Culture: Declining State Control over Leisure in the USSR, Poland and Hungary*. New York: Routledge.
52. Zubok, Vladislav. 1991. *Zhivago's Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.